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What it is about
The Strains of Commitments1 is an interesting attempt to deal with the per-
ceived tension between solidarity and diversity in modern societies. There 
is an uncomfortable cognitive dissonance between the intuition that a just 
society cannot survive without a shared belief in some ‘we’, and the belief 
that such disposition could have oppressive effects on minorities and out-
siders. The fear is that notional identities are being weakened, without be-
ing replaced by a cosmopolitan ideal capable to supply enough solidarity 
to sustain just institutions. With this aim in mind, Keith Banting and Will 
Kymlicka bring together political philosophers and social scientists to reflect 
on the multiple facets of this problem with their different contributions. The 
scientific core of the book revolves around three sets of questions: first, what 
solidarity is and why it is important, second to what extent (if at all) increas-
ing diversity undermines solidarity, third how solidarity can be politically 
activated.
Solidarity through time
The concept of Solidarity has a long heritage, and has been used in different 
senses. Many key political concepts (like justice, equality or liberty) suffer 
1 Review of K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds), The Strains of Commitments: The po-
litical sources of solidarity in diverse societies, New York, Oxford University Press, 2017.






from similar vagueness, yet they often do so because many people have tried 
to think about them and come up with different conclusions. If anything, 
solidarity suffers from the opposite problem: it has been mostly undertheo-
rized. Solidarity is «sometimes used as a nebulous concept that is not defined 
at all» (Stjernø 2009, 2), and indeed it appears undertheorized in sociolo-
gy (Alexander 2014; Reynolds 2014, 1), in political science (Stjernø 2009, 
20) and in moral and political philosophy (Bayertz 1999, 4; Scholz 2008, 
10). This lack of interest may derive from the fact that it has mostly been 
«confined to the realm of rhetoric» (Wilde 2007, 171) and its theoretical 
understanding is consequently «overshadowed by its appellative function» 
(Bayertz 1999, 4). Another reason may be that its intuitive meaning seems 
incompatible with the conception of «prototypically modern relationships as 
either vertical or atomized» (Alexander 2014, 303), which leaves no room for 
solidarity as a horizontal relation among individuals. 
The history of the idea of solidarity is thus quite conflicted. Reviewing 
many conceptions of solidarity, Stjernø concludes that «we are forced to ad-
mit that there is a high degree of variation within each variable and that each 
combination changes the meaning of the concept being studied» (2009, 89). 
The concept can be traced back to roman law, where the expression ‘Obligatio 
in Solidum’ referred to the obligation to repay the debts of your relatives in 
full. The original meaning of solidarity is this feeling of belonging with oth-
ers, which acts as an «inner cement holding together a society» (Bayertz 1999, 
9). It stands in opposition to what has been called ‘fluidarity’, i.e. a «lack of 
stable social relationship or bonds or connections, an absence of community 
or fellow-feeling» (Lukes 1999). Solidarity in this sense is partially grounded 
on «an interest in the integrity of a shared form of life that includes one’s 
own well-being» (Habermas 2015, 23), which gradually becomes ethically 
charged referring to the feeling of «being linked in one moral community» 
(Bayertz 1999), and being ‘co-responsible’ for the actions and desires, faults 
and merits of each other (Henckmann 1998, 131). Solidarity does not imply 
that all should have the same goal, but that they are willing to follow the 
group regardless of if they agree with its current aims (Kolers 2012).
While the concept of solidarity has a millennial story, the term solidarity 
is typically modern. It has been invented and employed by Pierre Leroux 
(1840) precisely in opposition to the universal Christian notion of charity. 
With solidarity, the subjective and spontaneous dimension of caring for others 
is abandoned in favour of an institutional design, which can provide more 
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efficiently for those in need, within the national boundaries. As such, it can 
be traced back to the concept of national fraternity in the French revolution, 
and has been formalized in article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1739 as the «holy duty to support the unfortunate members of society». 
Modern solidarity has thus become linked to the ‘redistribution of resources 
in favour of those in need’ (Bayertz 1999) and the national welfare state. 
Defining solidarity
Given solidarity’s lack of theorization and its variegated history, it is an 
important merit of Banting’s and Kymlicka’s book to narrow down soli-
darity’s definition, and establish a point of reference for future academic 
scholars. Solidarity is restricted to (1) an attitude, which is (2) political and 
(3) bounded.
First, solidarity is attitudinal. It refers to «set of feelings» (Parijs 2004, 375) 
involving «attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support» 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2017, 3). Cooperation is seen as both valuable and 
difficult, because everybody might otherwise be tempted to benefit without 
paying a price. The evocative Rawlsian expression «strains of commitment» 
(Rawls 1971, 126), which gives the book its name, is meant to represent 
precisely the costs that cooperation entails. The assumption is that self-in-
terest alone is insufficient to sustain political cooperation, particularly under 
conditions of diversity, and thus solidarity as a set of feelings that motivate 
people to pay the costs of cooperation seems necessary. Others do not follow 
the same premise, and either conceive solidarity as a rational interest (Cole-
man 1990, 390; Burelli 2016) or as a set of policies (Rothstein 2017). How-
ever, the ground of this attitude can be both moral feeling or self-interest, as 
the authors are convinced that «any plausible account is likely to combine 
them in various ways» (Banting and Kymlicka 2017, 8). This allows for an 
approach to solidarity which can be both bottom up, mobilizing feelings of 
shared membership to create redistributive institutions (Marshall 1949), and 
a top-down, where these feelings are the intended outcome of elite-driven 
reforms (Ferrera 2014). Moreover, solidarity attitudes are qualified in this 
book along three lines, following Thomas Humphrey Marshall’s theory of 
citizenship (1949): civic solidarity, democratic solidarity and redistributive 
solidarity. While many scholars conceive solidarity exclusively in redistrib-






utive terms, Kymlicka and Banting choose to offer a richer understanding, 
at the price of some clarity. Civic solidarity involves a commitment to live 
together in peace, and involves a degree of mutual tolerance for diversity. 
Democratic solidarity involves support for human rights and political equal-
ity, as well as democratic institutions. 
Secondly, solidarity is societal. It is taken to refer to feelings towards the 
broad political community. Banting and Kymlicka here follow the tradition 
of Emile Durkheim (1984) and view it as «glue that binds society and pre-
vents it from disintegrating» (Banting and Kymlicka 2017, 5). They oppose 
here many sociologists who, following Weber and Marx, talk of solidarity at 
the meso-level of social movements and groups (Stjernø 2009). Yet this spec-
ification is also helpful insofar as it sharpens the focus. Indeed, it is true that 
common feelings of being linked together in one community can emerge 
within smaller groups dedicated to a cause: the revolution in France and the 
communist movements were important historical examples of this dynamic, 
which extends to today’s social groups. Thus, one could raise the issue of sol-
idarity in these contexts. However, there is a graver importance of solidarity 
at the political level, because the entrance in the political institution is not 
voluntary as in any social group, and the unravelling of political institutions 
caused by lack of solidarity are more catastrophic than the withering away of 
any social movement. 
Thirdly, solidarity is bounded: it only applies within a specific group, 
which is smaller than the whole world. This means that contrary to cosmo-
politans’ hope, universal solidarity does not seem to be an option (although 
Van Parijs in the last part of the book challenges this pessimistic conclu-
sion). While justice among members is egalitarian, justice towards strangers 
is only humanitarian. All existing welfare states rely on bounded solidarity, 
and removing the distinction between insiders and outsiders risks levelling 
down social justice for insiders. Strong bonds of solidarity always seem to 
have an exclusionary dimension, and define a community by distinguishing 
neatly from others who do not belong to it. As Richard Rorty puts it: «our 
sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed 
are thought of as ‘one of us’, where ‘us’ means something smaller and more 
local than the human race» (Rorty 1989, 191). This divisive side of solidarity 
is often justified by linking it to reciprocity (Sangiovanni 2015): particular 
mutual ties bind us insofar as we are towards some shared aim (either work-
ing together towards as specific goal, like in a social movement, or simply 
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towards establishing the reinforced cooperation of state society). The prob-
lem of boundaries is in this book linked to diversity, which is often assumed 
to be inversely related to solidarity. Banting and Kymlicka are not entirely 
pessimistic and argue that empirical evidence on this is inconclusive (Van 
der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer 2013) or small (Stichnoth and Van der 
Straeten 2013). Thus, they concede that the popular perception of solidarity 
erosion is to a degree exaggerated as attitude for tolerance and inclusion are 
not lower than 20 or 40 years ago. However, they agree with the analysis 
of many contribution of this volume that with regards to the redistributive 
dimension of solidarity, one can perceive some sensible erosion. While uni-
versal liberal values seem sufficient to support civic and democratic solidar-
ity, empirical evidence suggests that redistributive solidarity requires thicker 
communal feelings.
Banting and Kymlicka, thus, redefine solidarity by viewing it as «attitu-
dinal in nature and societal in scope» and acknowledge its relevance on the 
basis of its ‘functional role in motivating compliance with the demands of 
justice’ (Banting and Kymlicka 2017, 6-7). Therefore, redistributive solidari-
ty fulfils its task only if it is somewhat bounded. 
Why it matters
The question of how to sustain solidarity within a liberal democracy is not 
only salient, but particularly difficult because liberal democratic principles 
undermine two historical vehicles of political solidarity: national identity and 
religion. 
According to the liberal consensus, sharing political principles of demo-
cratic justice is enough to sustain solidarity, regardless of the reasonable plu-
ralism about our ideas of the good life (Rawls 1971). However, the problem 
with this view is that these values are ‘nationally anonymous’ (Joppke 2004, 
253), and as such they cannot account for the bounded nature of redistribu-
tive solidarity, but inevitably drift towards cosmopolitism. 
Constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1997, 491-515; 1998, 105-154) 
and republican accounts (Pettit 1997) solve the puzzle by arguing that sol-
idarity is generated by taking active part in democratic life, which creates a 
sense of common destiny and mutual respect. However, empirical evidence 
does not register any correlation between the act of voting and solidarity dis-






positions  (Mansbridge 2003; Segall 2005). Even more gravely, solidarity 
dispositions were shaped by nation states before they developed democratic 
institutions (Canovan 1996), therefore it is difficult to claim that they de-
pend on it. Indeed, many classic defences of the transition from monarchy to 
democracy were based on the idea of national self-determination. 
However, basing solidarity on nationality is today a risky endeavour, in-
sofar as in its historical interpretation remains highly exclusionary of im-
migrants and minorities. The normative costs are very high, from a liberal 
perspective.
For this reason, liberal nationalists (Miller 1995) are those who attempt to 
follow a third way between classical liberalism, which is adequately thin but 
insufficient to motivate solidarity, and nationalism, which can ground soli-
darity but at an excessive normative price. They claim that not every feature 
of a national culture is exclusionary: while a common bloodline certainly is, 
a shared language or knowledge of history may not be. 
The book therefore captures a vital worry for contemporary liberal schol-
arship, and promises to shed some light on it by investigating both its the-
oretical framework and its empirical soundness. Additionally, this work 
evidently intersects many concerns of current democratic citizens, whose po-
litical systems are now polarized around a strong cleavage between opening 
and closure to different cultures.
How it is structured 
The first part of the volume is the most theoretical, and focuses on the phil-
osophical grounding of solidarity, clarifying under what conditions and for 
which reasons solidarity is desirable. 
David Miller opens the first part with an exploration of the value and 
sources of solidarity. He identifies it as a feeling that sustains practices and 
institutions of equality and inclusion. Miller characterizes solidarity in four 
ways: a sense of groupness, of mutual concern, of collective responsibility, 
and of equality. He then discusses five competing accounts on how solidarity 
can be sustained: expanding circles; interdependence; associational; nation-
al identity; and institutional. Yet instead of arguing in favour of the national 
identity, as his previous work may have suggested (Miller 1995), he con-
cludes that none of them is sufficient on its own. 
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Rainer Bauböck argues instead that the three different types of solidarity 
(civic, democratic and redistributive) should be associated with different lev-
els of political communities: the local level fits civic solidarity, the national 
level sustains redistributive solidarity and the regional level should support 
democratic solidarity (the EU being an example of this). Yet, Bauböck also 
prudently acknowledges that this potential to expand solidarity below and 
above the state needs to be politically activated, in order to be efficacious, and 
is not necessarily stable.
Jacob Levy closes the first section critically examining a key premise of the 
book: the need for solidarity. He argues that we cannot have bounded solidarity, 
because current societies are too diverse, and fellow citizens are ‘moral strangers 
to each other, united only by the shared circumstances of inhabiting a common 
political jurisdiction’ (Levy 2017, 108). Additionally, we should not want solidar-
ity, because the underlying ideology of unity can be dangerous and oppressive. 
Finally, we do not need solidarity because ‘just institutions are likely to arise or be 
stable out of nothing but calculative self-interest’ (Levy 2017, 121). 
The second section of the book presents empirical analyses of the sources 
of solidarity in current modern societies, and particularly inquires how much 
these are impacted by diversity. 
Céline Teney and Marc Helbling test the intuition that there is a contem-
porary divide between cosmopolitan elites, who identify as citizens of the 
world and are more tolerant of diversity but less favourable to redistributive 
solidarity, and masses, who cling to national redistributive solidarity but are 
less open towards outsiders. In this study, German elites are found not to 
conform to this view: while it is the case that they are more tolerant, this does 
not negatively impact their inclination towards redistribution. How far this 
conclusion can be generalized to other countries is at least uncertain, though.
Richard Johnston, Matthew Wright, Stuart Soroka and Jack Citrin dis-
tinguish between thin national patriotism or pride and thick nationalism. 
Their argument suggests that the form of national identity matters a lot for 
its possibly exclusionary dimension (it can be more aggressive or more in-
clusive), and this is continuously shaped and steered by elite discourse and 
by institutions. This evidence could provide an empirical grounding for the 
liberal nationalist middle ground.
Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorschot conclude the second part by in-
vestigating the possibility of citizenship as an alternative source of solidarity. 
Viewing other as fellow citizens might have a similar effect than viewing 






them as fellow national: both are boundary making concepts, yet citizenship 
is more open and tolerant of newcomers. 
The third and last section of the book explores the way feelings of soli-
darity are activated and mobilized in public debate. The following comments 
converge in emphasizing a weakening of inclusive solidarity and the rise of 
exclusive solidarity.
Peter Hall argues that the identification between solidarity feelings and 
national identity is oversimplified, because this is just one dimension of the 
wider cultural imaginaries shaped by political actors. Yet, he worries that 
those political actors who built solidaristic policy regimes (social democratic 
parties and trade unions) are now weakened to the point that they can no 
longer sustain this narrative, let alone expand it.
Zoe Lefkofridi and Elie Michel examine the relation between solidarity 
and the new populist ‘radical right’. They argue that their position is best 
described as ‘left authoritarian’, because it supports redistributive solidarity 
while being hostile towards diversity. This proves to be an effective combina-
tion, which is gaining political support in many countries.
Edward Koning inquires whether these parties are the cause or the ef-
fect of anti-immigration sentiments, with reference to the particular context 
Netherlands 2002 election. His analysis suggests that the sudden rise of the 
Pim Fortuyn List anti-immigration party did not affect the number of people 
against immigration, but did succeed in making this topic more salient in 
their voting behaviour.
Bo Rothstein (2017) argues that solidarity as a feeling is not threatened 
by the diversity of cultural views per se. While it may seem so, a more accu-
rate analysis shows that the true casual factor is a lack of social trust, which 
is often, but not always, associated with diversity. In fact, wherever welfare 
institutions are efficient, there is enough social trust to overcome diffidence 
towards diversity. Rothstein concludes by suggesting that efficient welfare in-
stitutions will be able to engender their own political consensus, even under 
conditions of diversity. 
Irene Bloemraad argues that multiculturalism is a realistic goal, because 
internal diversity has few if any direct effects on redistributive solidarity and 
indirect effects are too remote to identify. However, external immigrants are 
very often excluded by this redistributive solidarity. Countries that instituted 
more inclusive policies towards immigrants, like Canada or the USA, have 
done so unintentionally by satisfying claims of internal minorities. 
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Karin Borevi claims that there are different ‘philosophies of integration’ in 
each country. Interestingly, Danish elites assume a society centric view, that 
societal cohesion is a precondition of a stable welfare state, while Swedish 
elites view the welfare state as an engine to generate social thrust. She argues 
that these elites assume dissimilar positions because of the different history of 
their own nation-state building.
Patrick Loobuyck and Dave Sinardet study the relation between solidar-
ity and identity in Belgium, finding that three national identities exist there 
(Fleming, Wallon, and pan-Belgian). While the pan-Belgian identity may be 
appropriately thin not to compromise diversity, the degree to which it can 
sustain redistributive solidarity is uncertain. Belgium, they conclude, is the 
perfect test case to investigate how far diversity can be pushed without affect-
ing solidarity and reversing the stability it provides.
Contrary to the previous pessimistic analysis, the book closes with some 
optimistic reflections from Philippe Van Parijs, who imagines a future under 
a more open solidarity. The closure in the historical process that generated the 
welfare state through «bounding, bonding and binding» (Ferrera 2017, 47) 
will slowly fade away when confronted with the increased globalization and 
diversity of modern times. Yet, this need not end in an era of unsolidaristic 
cosmopolitanism. Van Parjis identifies a possible way out in the civilizing 
force of deliberative democracy, understood as the need to justify the use of 
power to all those subjected to it, regardless of how far they are situated. Such 
a transnational justificatory community would help advance the demands of 
justice «even under conditions in which enhanced diversity fragilizes solidar-
ity» (Van Parijs 2017, 425). One is left wondering, however, if the existence 
of such a community does not require the solidarity dispositions that is in-
tended to render irrelevant.
Closing remarks
The same tension between diversity and unity, aptly diagnosed within lib-
eral societies, is present in this book, which is a successful attempt at multi-
cultural literature’. The different perspectives result in an extraordinary rich 
kaleidoscopic outlook. As it often happens with collected works, the result 
is however inconsistent on occasions. As I have previously remarked, Levy 
and Van Parijs among others expose views in sharp contrast with some of 






the common assumption behind Banting and Kymlicka’s intent. The reader 
will thus be required to evaluate conflicting accounts and superimpose his 
own coherence on a variegated book, but those so inclined will find a well of 
insightful arguments and data to mine. 
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